{"id":14547,"date":"2019-07-02T10:32:44","date_gmt":"2019-07-02T08:32:44","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/?p=14547"},"modified":"2024-07-22T19:27:14","modified_gmt":"2024-07-22T17:27:14","slug":"first-price-vs-second-price-auction","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/first-price-vs-second-price-auction\/","title":{"rendered":"First-Price vs. Second-Price Auction &#8211; What Are the Main Differences?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The <strong>First-Price auction<\/strong>, which will be implemented on the Google Ad Manager level by the end of July 2019, differs a lot from a well-known in the programmatic market <strong>Second-Price<\/strong> model. The main difference between these two types lies in a model of determining the final price paid by the buyer. Despite the fact that the bid was the same in both cases. <br> <br>So far both these models have been used simultaneously. <em>Second-Price<\/em> by Google, and the <em>First-Price<\/em> by most of the other large SSPs. In effect, the market was a little mixed.&nbsp;<a aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color:crimson\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/google-switches-to-first-price-auction\/\" target=\"_blank\">However, it won\u2019t last long<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Many market participants have difficulty with understanding what exactly will change after Google\u2019s move to <a href=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/a-tiny-gamechanger\/\">Unified Pricing Rules<\/a>, and what will be the exact impact. To get that properly, you have to begin with the fundamentals of these auction types.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 style=\"font-size: 20px;\">Second-Price Auction<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><br>In this auctioning model, bidders set the price which they are willing to pay for an impression. However, the price they bid rarely is the exact amount they pay, as the winning bidder pays only 0.01$ more than the second-highest bid. Let\u2019s explain this on real numbers. <br><br>There are 3 bidders:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-list\"><li>Bids 2.10$<\/li><li>Bids 2.80$<\/li><li>Bids 2.50$<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The highest bid in this auction amounts to 2.80$. But the price paid will be 2.51$.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"430\" src=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/cornerstone3v-01-1024x430.png\" alt=\"First Price vs Second Price Auction\" class=\"wp-image-15460\" srcset=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/cornerstone3v-01-1024x430.png 1024w, https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/cornerstone3v-01-300x126.png 300w, https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/cornerstone3v-01-150x63.png 150w, https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/cornerstone3v-01-768x323.png 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">A <em>Second-Price auction<\/em>, despite its scale, is considered by many to not be the best solution for programmatic.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><i>For years, modified Second-Price auctions were the industry standard and the mass-adopted norm, despite their inherent lack of transparency and revenue-reducing constraints. The only way to achieve a truly fair, unified auction was by shifting to first-price, which is exactly what independent ad exchanges (Index included) began to do a few years\u2019 back. Slowly but surely, this shift brought greater fairness to the market, boosting buyers\u2019 win rates and publishers\u2019 revenue opportunities along the way<\/i>.  <a aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color:crimson\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.indexexchange.com\/googles-first-price-auction-shift-is-just-the-start-towards-full-transparency\/\" target=\"_blank\">The Drum<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:50px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<!-- Begin Mailchimp Signup Form -->\n<link href=\"\/\/cdn-images.mailchimp.com\/embedcode\/horizontal-slim-10_7.css\" rel=\"stylesheet\" type=\"text\/css\">\n<style type=\"text\/css\">\n\t#mc_embed_signup{background:#fff; clear:left; font:14px Helvetica,Arial,sans-serif; width:100%;}\n\t\/* Add your own Mailchimp form style overrides in your site stylesheet or in this style block.\n\t   We recommend moving this block and the preceding CSS link to the HEAD of your HTML file. *\/\n<\/style>\n<div id=\"mc_embed_signup\">\n<form action=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.us7.list-manage.com\/subscribe\/post?u=0a65a0626fcc516279eb5d544&amp;id=53c5dbaf01\" method=\"post\" id=\"mc-embedded-subscribe-form\" name=\"mc-embedded-subscribe-form\" class=\"validate\" target=\"_blank\" novalidate=\"\">\n    <div id=\"mc_embed_signup_scroll\">\n\t<label for=\"mce-EMAIL\">Would you like to get the latest AdTech &amp; Digital Marketing news &amp; insights delivered right to your inbox every Friday? Subscribe to The Yieldbird Digest!<\/label>\n\t<input type=\"email\" value=\"\" name=\"EMAIL\" class=\"email\" id=\"mce-EMAIL\" placeholder=\"email address\" required=\"\">\n    <!-- real people should not fill this in and expect good things - do not remove this or risk form bot signups-->\n    <div style=\"position: absolute; left: -5000px;\" aria-hidden=\"true\"><input type=\"text\" name=\"b_0a65a0626fcc516279eb5d544_53c5dbaf01\" tabindex=\"-1\" value=\"\"><\/div>\n    <div class=\"clear\"><input type=\"submit\" value=\"Subscribe\" name=\"subscribe\" id=\"mc-embedded-subscribe\" class=\"button\"><\/div>\n    <\/div>\n<\/form>\n<\/div>\n\n<!--End mc_embed_signup-->\n\n\n\n<div style=\"height:40px\" aria-hidden=\"true\" class=\"wp-block-spacer\"><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 style=\"font-size: 20px;\"><br>The second-price auction was first known as a \u201cVickrey Auction\u201d<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color\"><br><i>Bidders submit written bids without knowing the bid of the other people in the auction. The highest bidder wins, but the price paid is the second-highest bid. This type of auction is strategically similar to an English auction and gives bidders an incentive to bid their true value. The auction was first described academically by Columbia University professor William Vickrey in 1961, though it had been used by <\/i><a rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\" aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color:crimson\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Stamp_collecting\" target=\"_blank\"> <b>stamp collectors<\/b><\/a> <i> since 1893. In 1797 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe sold a manuscript using a sealed-bid, second-price auction<\/i>. <a rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\" aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color:crimson\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Vickrey_auction\" target=\"_blank\">Wiki<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 style=\"font-size: 20px;\">However, with time it has evolved into Generalized second-price Auction (GSP)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><br><i>The generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) is a non-truthful auction mechanism for multiple items. Each bidder places a bid. The highest bidder gets the first slot, the second-highest, the second slot and so on, but the highest bidder pays the price bid by the second-highest bidder, the second-highest pays the price bid by the third-highest, and so on. First conceived as a natural extension of the Vickrey auction, it conserves some of the desirable properties of the Vickrey auction. It is used mainly in the context of keyword auctions, where sponsored search slots are sold on an auction basis. The first analyses of GSP are in the economics literature by Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz and by Varian. It is employed by Google&#8217;s AdWords technology<\/i>. <a aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color:crimson\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Generalized_second-price_auction\" target=\"_blank\">Wiki<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The <strong>second-price auction<\/strong> model is familiar not only to programmatic. It\u2019s used widely by many other marketplaces as well. eBay is a great example of such a phenomenon. It\u2019s a large multinational e-commerce company, which lets you bid on the product you\u2019d like to buy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 style=\"font-size: 20px;\">First-Price Auction<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><br>This auction model is significantly more simple and transparent. Those are the reasons why Google is making this loud change in its auction mechanics.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">This auctioning type works in the way that everyone usually expects auctions to be. Let\u2019s assume the same scenario we had in the <em>Second-Price auction<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">There are 3 bidders:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-list\"><li>Bids 2.10$<\/li><li>Bids 2.80$<\/li><li>Bids 2.50$<\/li><\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">The highest bid in this auction amounts to 2.80$. So this is the price that will be paid.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"430\" src=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/cornerstone3v-02-1024x430.png\" alt=\"First Price Auction vs Second Price Auction\" class=\"wp-image-15459\" srcset=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/cornerstone3v-02-1024x430.png 1024w, https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/cornerstone3v-02-300x126.png 300w, https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/cornerstone3v-02-150x63.png 150w, https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/cornerstone3v-02-768x323.png 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 style=\"font-size: 20px;\">What do Google\u2019s managers have to say about this change?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><br><i>In the very early days of programmatic buying, publishers typically used only one auction to sell their ad inventory. Today the programmatic ecosystem has evolved into a much more complex marketplace where a single ad can pass through a mix of auctions, with different rules, before a winning bid price is selected and an ad is served. This complexity has made it difficult for advertisers and agencies to properly value programmatic inventory, and it has driven our publishers and app developers to implement increasingly complicated ad monetization strategies, reducing transparency across the industry. Further, the increasing intricacy of programmatic has made it operationally very difficult, even for experts, to determine what\u2019s going well and what needs to be improved<\/i>. <a aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color:crimson\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.blog.google\/products\/admanager\/simplifying-programmatic-first-price-auctions-google-ad-manager\/\" target=\"_blank\">Sam Cox<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><i>Currently, the Ad Manager may run two different auctions for a specific ad. A Second-Price, real-time bidding auction run with Authorized Buyers \u2014 which includes Google Ads, Display &amp; Video 360 and other Demand Side Platforms \u2014 followed by a First-Price auction that compares the winning price from the Second-Price auction with a publisher\u2019s guaranteed and non-guaranteed advertising campaigns, as well as bids from Exchange Bidding buyers. By switching to a unified First-Price auction, we can reduce this multi-stage process and provide all non-guaranteed advertising sources the same opportunity to win an auction<\/i>. <a aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color:crimson\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/www.blog.google\/products\/admanager\/update-first-price-auctions-google-ad-manager\/\" target=\"_blank\">Jason Bigler<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 style=\"font-size: 20px;\">First Price vs Second Price Auctions &#8211; what does the future of auction types hold for digital Publishers?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\"><br>These changes will impact each entity in the programmatic market. It\u2019s important to get prepared on time in order to gain an advantage. The change will allow for progress and development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-very-dark-gray-color has-text-color has-normal-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">We expect that Publishers with <a aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color:crimson\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" href=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/google-switches-to-first-price-auction\/\" target=\"_blank\">First-Price ready pricing and sales strategies may even see revenue <\/a>increase in the first few months after the Google full transition, but in the long run, revenue should remain more or less at the same level. Another scenario can be applied to the ones driving the lowest level of competition in the auction by setting no floor prices, for whom there is a clear risk of revenue decrease due to the <a aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color:crimson\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener nofollow\" href=\"https:\/\/site.adform.com\/knowledgecenter\/thought-leadership\/introducing-dynamic-cpm\/\" target=\"_blank\">rapid development of Bid Shading algorithms of the DSP\u2019 side.<\/a> In order to prevent it, it is highly recommended to have a good understanding of the specific parts of your inventory value for buyers, and a proper level of recognition regarding main competitors pricing strategies, and inventory quality.<\/p>\n\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The First-Price auction, which will be implemented on the Google Ad Manager level by the end of July 2019, differs a lot from a well-known in the programmatic market Second-Price model. The main difference between these two types lies in a model of determining the final price paid by the buyer. Despite the fact that [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":55,"featured_media":14662,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[28],"tags":[],"content-category":[],"class_list":["post-14547","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-ad-tech"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14547","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/55"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14547"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14547\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":33471,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/14547\/revisions\/33471"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/14662"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14547"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=14547"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=14547"},{"taxonomy":"content-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/content-category?post=14547"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}