{"id":20838,"date":"2019-12-05T12:39:40","date_gmt":"2019-12-05T11:39:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/?p=20838"},"modified":"2024-07-22T19:27:13","modified_gmt":"2024-07-22T17:27:13","slug":"header-bidding-in-the-era-of-first-price-auction","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/header-bidding-in-the-era-of-first-price-auction\/","title":{"rendered":"Header Bidding in the Era of First-Price Auction"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\"> After Google announced its decision to move Ad Manager\u2019s non-guarantee inventory to the model of First-Price Auction, the entire programmatic industry began speculating on the <strong style=\"color: crimson;\"><a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color: crimson;\" href=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/google-switches-to-first-price-auction\/\" target=\"_blank\">potential repercussions<\/a><\/strong> of this decision. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-media-text alignwide\" style=\"grid-template-columns:20% auto\"><figure class=\"wp-block-media-text__media\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/12\/0219-HB-in-the-first-price-01-02-1024x640.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20845\"\/><\/figure><div class=\"wp-block-media-text__content\">\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\">Apart from the need for changes in Price Management Strategy and protection from Bid Shading, one expectation related to the decreasing importance of Header Bidding for Publisher monetization setups: this was due to the lack of auction pressure it used to have on ADx in the Second-Price model, which has now been taken from it with the establishment of the <strong style=\"color: crimson;\"><a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color: crimson;\" href=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/a-tiny-gamechanger\/\" target=\"_blank\">Unified Pricing Rules<\/a><\/strong>.  <\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-text-align-left has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\">In this article, we have looked to share our observations on the first two months of the Header Bidding situation in the light of the First-Price auction reality and to assess whether fears of its imminent demise were at all justified.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 style=\"font-size: 20px; text-align:center\"><strong>Performance of Header Bidding in the First-Price ecosystem<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 style=\"font-size: 18px;\"><br><strong>Rates<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/12\/1a-1024x682.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20839\"\/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\"><br>The above chart shows an increase in the eCPM index (price for 1000 impressions) in the period preceding the entry of First Price. The auction in the first price model was introduced gradually from the beginning of September and on 26.09 it reached its maximum level, i.e. a virtually 100% inventory was covered by the First Price model. Rates increased from EUR 0.6 eCPM to over EUR 0.7 eCPM, which translated to 14%. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\">The data used for the above analysis is derived from four different GAM accounts from different regions of the world, and in these accounts, many websites are monetized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\">The increase in the <strong style=\"color: crimson;\"><a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color: crimson;\" href=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/ecpm-rcpm\/\" target=\"_blank\">eCPM indicator<\/a><\/strong> in Header Bidding may be due to two factors: <\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-list\"><li>Due to an increase in ADX rates, Header Bidding, in order to display its strength, was &#8220;forced&#8221; to bid higher. In the First Price environment, higher ADX bids mean that only higher bids from Header Bidding have a chance of winning the \u2018bid and display\u2019.<\/li><li>The logic of the UPR operation is that floors work on the basis of the 12th priority, to include Header Bidding. This removes all bids below the given bid from the auction, which automatically increases the eCPM indicator. In the long run, the set rates may cause buyers to increase their bids in order to feature on a given inventory; of course, the condition for this would be a high-quality inventory.<\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<h3 style=\"font-size: 18px;\"><strong>Platforms<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\"><br>The eCPM saw an increase on all platforms. The charts below show the performance of two SSP\u2019s: <strong style=\"color: crimson;\"><a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color: crimson;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.similartech.com\/compare\/appnexus-vs-criteo\" target=\"_blank\">Criteo and Appnexus<\/a><\/strong>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/12\/2a.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20840\"\/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/12\/3a-1024x682.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20841\"\/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h3 style=\"font-size: 18px;\"><br>Revenue <\/h3>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/12\/4a-1024x682.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20842\"\/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\"><br>The chart above shows an increase in revenues arising from Header Bidding. The increase in after entering the First Price model is close to 50%. As Olive wrote in her article, <strong style=\"color: crimson;\"><a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color: crimson;\" href=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/post-first-price\/\" target=\"_blank\">after the introduction of the First Price model<\/a><\/strong>, rates on ADX increased. This led to a ramping up of the pressure on bidders and buyers in Header Bidding. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\">It is worth remembering that most platforms buying through Header Bidding have for a long time operated on the basis of the First Price model. This adjustment was one of the outcomes of buyers adapting to the changes introduced in the bidding model in AD Manager.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 style=\"font-size: 20px; text-align:center\"><strong>Header Bidding vs other revenue sources <\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<h3 style=\"font-size: 18px;\"><br><strong>Header Bidding revenue share<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/12\/5a.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-20843\"\/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\"><br>The chart above shows an increase in revenue share from Header Bidding compared to the total revenue from Open Market. The observed increase was from 9% to 12%, which meant a change of 3 percentage points. This change is not large, but clearly observable. We may suspect that the increase in the share of revenues from HB resulted from the buyer of this technology adapting to the higher ADX. Initially, after 26\/09, growth was notably less dynamic; although things did pick up later. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 style=\"font-size: 20px; text-align:center\"><strong>Unified Pricing Rules and\ntheir impact on Header Bidding<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\"><br>UPR rates differ from previously available rates targeting Open Market on ADX on several issues. The first difference is that UPR prices target all sources of monetization present in the Open Market environment &#8211; ADX Open Market, Open Bidding, and Header Bidding. It is not possible to give a different price to buyers from ADX and a different price to buyers through SSPs in Open Bidding or Header Bidding. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\">This procedure certainly has limited possibilities when it comes to the Supply Optimization process &#8211; a process that involves finding an opportunity to buy the same inventory at different prices, by buying inventory through different platforms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 style=\"font-size: 18px;\"><strong>What are the ramifications of UPR?<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\"><br>Any publisher wanting to use UPR is now forced to pay Header Bidding for the same price. As a result, some of the lowest Header Bidding bids have been removed, which in the long run will force buyers to bid higher. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\">Another change is that UPR rates will not allow for the anonymous price that targeted buyers without the need for a detailed inventory revealing what they had bought. Anonymous buying inventories have ceased to exist since the UPR rates have come into force. This means that currently there is no cheaper version of inventory, wherein buyers may buy inventory unknown to them. However, this change has not affected HB, only ADX.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\">Setting UPR rates is primarily intended to protect inventory against the <strong style=\"color: crimson;\"><a rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" aria-label=\" (opens in a new tab)\" style=\"color: crimson;\" href=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/what-is-bid-shading\/\" target=\"_blank\">bid shading<\/a><\/strong> process. This process sees buyers endeavoring to lower bidding prices and assess if the same inventory can be bought more cheaply. Due to the fact that UPR also targets Header Bidding, the real value of inventory will also be preserved when monetized by Header Bidding. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-media-text alignwide\" style=\"grid-template-columns:23% auto\"><figure class=\"wp-block-media-text__media\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"640\" src=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/0143-GDPR-02-1024x640.png\" alt=\"Ticked box icon gdpr\" class=\"wp-image-15151\" srcset=\"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/0143-GDPR-02-1024x640.png 1024w, https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/0143-GDPR-02-300x188.png 300w, https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/0143-GDPR-02-150x94.png 150w, https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/07\/0143-GDPR-02-768x480.png 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure><div class=\"wp-block-media-text__content\">\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\">\n\nConsidering that currently all platforms buying through Header Bidding and ADX are bidding in the First Price Auction model, the entire bidding environment is pretty much uniform in terms of a floor price and the terms of bidding.\n\n<\/p>\n<\/div><\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 style=\"font-size: 20px;\"><strong>Summary<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\"><br>The introduction of the First Price auction model on Ad Manager was extremely important for the programmatic ecosystem. After the introduction of the new bidding model, we observed two main changes in the Header Bidding performance arising from the reality of buyers having to adapt to the new bidding environment:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-list\"><li>Increase of the eCPM<\/li><li>Increase in the share of Open Market revenues from Header Bidding <\/li><\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-text-color has-normal-font-size has-very-dark-gray-color wp-block-paragraph\">For now, our analysis of the performance of Header Bidding allows us to state that the change introduced by Google has had a positive impact on the performance of this technology. Of course, this can be in part a result of the adjustment period on the buyer\u2019s side, or simply a distortion brought about by the Q4 demand increase. So it would be safe to wait at least until Q1 before formulating any categorical conclusions. Either way, I think it\u2019s safe to say that Header Bidding is here to stay and its value for Publishers will remain relevant. <\/p>\n\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>After Google announced its decision to move Ad Manager\u2019s non-guarantee inventory to the model of First-Price Auction, the entire programmatic industry began speculating on the potential repercussions of this decision. Apart from the need for changes in Price Management Strategy and protection from Bid Shading, one expectation related to the decreasing importance of Header Bidding [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":28,"featured_media":21031,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"content-category":[],"class_list":["post-20838","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"acf":[],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20838","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/28"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=20838"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20838\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":33432,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/20838\/revisions\/33432"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=20838"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=20838"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=20838"},{"taxonomy":"content-category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/yieldbird.com\/research-hub\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/content-category?post=20838"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}